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Abstract
The rapid growth of internet and web based applications has given rise to the
number of attacks on the network. The way the attacker attacks the system diers
from one attacker to the other. The sequence of attack or the signature of an
attacker should be stored, analyzed and used to generate rules for mitigating future
attack attempts. We have deployed honeypot to record the activities of the attacker.
While the attacker prepares for an attack, the IDS redirects him to the honeypot.
We make the attacker believe that he is working with the actual system. The
activities related to the attack are recorded by the honeypot by interacting with the
intruder. The recorded activities are analyzed by the network administrator, and
the rule database is updated. As a result, we improve the detection accuracy and
security of the system using honeypot without any loss or damage to the original
system. As the number of threats to the information is increasing, there is a need
for a powerful intrusion detection system that can actually full the requirement of
security against the threat. This type of security can be achieved by identifying the
particular type of attack. The classication of attack activities ensures the ecient
countermeasure for the attack. The work focuses on the classication of attack
using multiclass support vector machine approach. The support vector machine
is used for binary classication. This approach is extended to the multiclass
classication of attack with improved accuracy of classication. We have used
three benchmark datasets for training and testing purpose: KDD corrected dataset,
NSLKDD dataset, Gure KDD dataset. We have also compared the results with
existing work. The evaluation gives better accuracy for detection of attack than the
existing approach. The evaluation provides better accuracy for detection of attack
than the existing approach.
Keywords: Honeypot, IDS, Threat, KDD corrected dataset, NSLKDD dataset, Gure
KDD dataset
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The highly integrated electronic world is an eect of technological development over
decades. The number of malicious activities and attacks are also growing beside the
advances in security against threats. To cope with this situation, various attempts
are made to control the attack activities. There is a need to improve and innovate
dierent techniques for the detection of intrusion against the crucial as well as an
enormous amount of information [1].
Intrusion Detection
Intrusion is an unauthorised access to the system with the intent of doing theft of
information or harms the system. The act of detecting intrusions, monitoring the
incidents occurring in the computer system, the suspicious or unusual activities,
taking place in the system, which can be the possible attack, is known as intrusion
detection [1].
Intrusion Detection System
The software or hardware system that monitors the information for attack and iden-
ties the possible events carried out by the intruder, attempts to eliminate them
1
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and prepares a record to send it to the administrators in a real-time situation. The
Intrusion detection system is dierent from the rewall security as IDS provides
some extra functionality like producing alerts, logs of messages for the reference to
the administrator. [2].
1.1 Background
An intrusion detection system has been identied as an eective research eld of re-
search for about three decades. Computer Security Threat Monitoring and surveil-
lance was the rst paper that was published by James Anderson working in this
area in 1980. The government projects concerning the development of IDS were
undertaken by Peter Neumann and Dorothy Denning during 1983 and 1986. Their
research successfully developed the real time IDS that was the rst model of IDS. It
was popularly known as Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES). Some experts
had carried out some attacks on the internet sites, in 1980s. Some exploiting scripts
and self-regulating tools were used for attacking the system. When the experts found
that the number of security threats had been increasing during 2006 to 2010, the
deployment of IDS for network security became a primary need for protecting the
from attacks [2].
1.2 Types of IDS
1.2.1 Network-based IDS (NIDS)
Network Intrusion Detection System includes network intrusion detection capabili-
ties. It analyses a trac passing throughout the subnet. The trac over the network
is compared with the database of known attacks. The administrator will be sent an
alert if the attack is identied. NIDS monitors the trac going through the partic-
ular network segment or devices. NIDS collects the data as the network packets; So
it is also called as packet-snier [2].
2
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1.2.2 Host-based IDS (HIDS)
In Host Intrusion Detection System, the malicious activities taking place in the single
host are scanned. HIDS collects logs, operations, unauthorised access, alterations
and unusual changes in the conguration of the system. HIDS is deployed on the
most crucial hosts containing highly essential and openly available information. Such
hosts include workstations or servers [2].
1.3 IDS techniques
There are four basic techniques of IDS for two basic types of IDS (HIDS and NIDS):
[3].
1.3.1 Anomaly detection
The IDS establishes a normal usage pattern and anything that widely deviates from
it gets agged is considered as possible intrusion. An anomaly is an incident that
occurs on frequency less than or greater than a standard deviation from statistical
point of view. Anomalies are identied by deviations from normal behaviour and
any deviation from it is agged as suspect. In this way, new types of intrusions can
be identied by using new patterns in the deviation from normal usage or pattern.
The drawback of using this technique is that it raises a very high false alarm and
any previously unseen behaviour can also be categorised as an attack. It is designed
to uncover the abnormal patterns of behaviour [3].
1.3.2 Misuse detection (Signature detection)
In this technique, there is the dataset in which each of the instances is labelled as
either normal or attack and a learning algorithm is trained on the labelled data.
As long as the instances are labelled appropriately; the intrusion detection model
can be retrained accordingly that include new types of attack. Models of misuse
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are sophisticated as they are automatically created. They can detect known attacks
with great accuracy. Their disadvantage is that they cannot detect new attacks
and they depend on signatures extracted by human experts. The known patterns
of unauthorised behaviour are specically used to detect and predict subsequent
similar attempts. These specic patterns are called signatures. One example of sig-
nature is "three failed logins", for hostbasedintrusion detection. A specic pattern
that matches a portion of network packet can be as simple as a signature for net-
work intrusion detection. For example, an unauthorised action can be indicated by
header content signatures and/or packet content signatures. Some response, alarm,
or notications should be sent to the proper authority relying on the seriousness or
robustness of the signature that is triggered [3].
1.3.3 Target Monitoring
These systems look for the modication of specied les instead of actively searching
for anomalies or misuse. This is designed to uncover an unauthorized action after
it occurs to reverse it. The cryptographic hash is computed beforehand to check
for the covert editing of les. This type of system does not require constant moni-
toring by the administrator, So it is the easiest to implement. It needs to compute
integrity checksum hashes at whatever intervals and on either all les or just the
mission/system critical les [3].
1.3.4 Stealth Probes
The attacker who chooses to carry out his/her mission for long period is detected
using this technique. For example, an intruder launches an attack to know the
vulnerabilities and open ports in the system for a particular period and then he
waits for two months and again launches the actual attack. By collecting a variety
of data throughout the system, stealth probes check for any methodical attacks
over an extended period of time. In an attempt to uncover suspicious activity, this
4
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method combines anomaly detection and misuse detection [3].
1.3.5 Hybrid based IDS
Hybrid based IDS combines all the advantages of the IDS techniques and overcomes
their drawbacks. We have used this approach to improve our intrusion detection
system. In our IDS, anomaly based approach is used to detect new attacks. The
signature based approach is used to generate the rules for unknown attacks. The
target monitoring and stealth probe are also used to identify suspicious activities.
1.4 KDDcup99 Dataset
The KDD cup99 dataset is the benchmark dataset for intrusion detection system.
There are three KDD datasets, i.e., KDD corrected, nslKDD, GureKDD. There are
311029 instances in KDD corrected dataset, 125973 in nslKDD dataset and 178835
in GureKDD dataset. There are 41 features in each of the dataset, and every record
is labelled as either normal or attack. The attack falls in one of the four categories:
Denial of service attack (DoS), User to root attack (U2R), Remote to Local Attack
(R2L), Probing Attack [4].
• Denial of service attack (DoS): In DOS attack, an attacker prevents the au-
thorised user from consuming and accessing the services through land, back,
Neptune, pod, teardrop and Smurf.
• User to root attack (U2R): The attacker attacks the victim machine with
?Buer overow? attack to accesses super user privileges while he has right
for only local access.
• Remote to Local Attack (R2L): In this type of attack the attacker guesses or
breaks the password to access the victim machine.
5
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• Probing Attack: In this attack, an attacker attempts to know the information
about the victim machine with the intent to check the vulnerability. For
example, port scan.
The features are categorised into three types: Basic features, trac features and
content based features [5].
• Basic features: This category encapsulates all the attributes that can be ex-
tracted from a TCP/IP connection.
• Trac features: The feature that are computed with respect to a window
interval are included in this category. The two groups of these features are
"same host" features and "same service" features.
• Content features: Some attacks like U2R and R2L are related to the data
portion of the packets. Some features are needed for detecting the suspicious
behaviour that is seen in these attacks. The features like the number of failed
login attempts are called content features.
1.4.1 KDD corrected dataset
In KDD corrected dataset the existing irrelevant and redundant features are deleted
from the dataset that results in less resource consumption, faster training and testing
process, as well as maintaining high detection rates.
1.4.2 GureKDDcup Dataset
GureKDD dataset contains the information that has directly been extracted from the
payload of each connection. For generating GureKDDcup dataset, the same steps
are followed by the GureKDDcup capture team as that of KDD cup 99 dataset. The
tcpdump les were processed with bro-ids to get each connection with its attributes.
Finally, each connection of the dataset is labelled based on connections-class les
provided by MIT. The size of the original dataset is 9.3 GB, and the size of 6%
6
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dataset is 4.2 GB. Santosh et al. have tabulated the remaining information regarding
attack categories, number of samples, duplicate records, their reduced rate, sample
categories, a number of samples after reduction of duplicate samples, etc. in [4].
1.4.3 NSLKDD dataset
NSLKDD dataset is an attempt to solve some of the problems that are discussed
in [5]. There are reasonable number of instances in the NSLKDD test dataset (22544)
and train dataset (125973). So, there is no need to select randomly a small portion of
the set, and the experiment can be run on the complete set. By using this dataset,
consistent and comparable results can be obtained. The testing dataset includes
some attacks that are absent in the training set. The more details are present in [5].
1.5 Framework of IDS using honeypot and SVM
classier
Dataset
Feature Selec
 
on
Feature Reduc
 
on
Model Forma
 
on 
using MSVM
Capture 
Packet using 
Honeypot
Normal Malicious
Figure 1.1: Block Diagram
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1.6 Feature Selection
The dataset may contain many irrelevant and redundant attributes(features) which
do not contribute to the output. But their presence aects the performance of the
system. It is necessary to identify and remove such attributes. This process is called
as feature selection. It not only increases the speed and accuracy of the system but
makes the system work eectively. The characteristics of feature are as follows: [6]:
• Relevant: The features that are having an impact on the output are relevant
attributes. They cannot be removed or replaced.
• Irrelevant: The features that do not have any impact on the output are irrel-
evant features.
• Redundant: whenever a feature can take the role of another, and there is no
eect of removing the feature, a redundancy exists.
Generation
original
feature 
set
Subset of
features
Evaluation
Goodness of 
The subset
Stopping 
Criterion
no
Selected 
subset
Validation
yes
Figure 1.2: Feature subset selection
1.7 Honeypot
Honeypot is the system to deceive the attacker by providing the decoy system that
seems to be highly valuable, but badly secured so that the attacker can interact
with that system. The administrator can analyze the attacker's interaction with the
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system and categorize that attack by which the intent of the attackers can be known
as discussed in [7] [8].
If a honeypot successfully interacts with the intruder, the intruder will never
know that she/he is being monitored and tricked. Most of the honeypots are installed
inside rewalls through which it can be controlled in a better way, although it can
also be installed outside the rewalls. A rewall restricts the trac coming from
the Internet, whereas honeypot allows the trac on the Internet and restricts the
trac sent back from the system [7]. The parameters that are used to know the
value fetched from a Honeypot are given by [9]: (i) Type of deployment of honeypot
and (ii) Scenario of deployment (location of deployment i.e. behind rewall inside
DMZ, in front of rewall etc).On the basis of these parameters a honeypot can act
in the same way as bulgur alarm for detection of attacks, Prevention of attacks by
deception and deterrence, responding to attacks by providing valuable logs regarding
attack [9].
1.7.1 Areas of deployment
There are two areas of deployment of honeypot: physical honeypots and virtual
honeypots. In case of physical honeypots, the original system is allowed to compro-
mise completely by the intruder. There is a risk to the system to be damaged by
the intruder. So, another approach called as a virtual honeypot that provides the
attacker with a vulnerable system that is not actually the real system is used, but
the attacker never knows that he is dealing with the virtual system [9].
1.7.2 Types of Honeypot
There are two types of honeypot: High Interaction Honeypot and Low Interaction
Honeypot. In a high-interaction honeypot, the attacker can interact with a real
system. While a low-interaction honeypots provides only some parts such as the
network stack. The high interaction honeypot allows the adversary to compromise
9
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fully the system to launch the network attack. There is a greater risk in deploying
high interaction honeypot. It takes more time for analyzing the events; it may take
several days to know the intent of the attacker. It needs high maintenance, so it is
very hard to deploy. These are the drawbacks of a high interaction honeypot.
Due to the drawbacks and risk in the deployment of a high-interaction honeypot,
we have used the low interaction honeypot. Low-interaction honeypots are used to
collect the statistical data and high-level information about attack patterns. Since
an attacker interacts just with a simulation, he cannot fully compromise the system.
A controlled environment is constructed by Low-interaction honeypots, and thus the
limited risk is involved: As the attacker cannot completely compromise the system,
we do not need to worry about abuses of our low-interaction honeypots [9].
1.8 Support Vector Machine
The classication is used to achieve high accuracy for classifying maximum number
of instances with a small number of training samples. Support Vector Machine is
one of such classier that can be applied to the intrusion detection dataset. The
orientation of hyperplane is in such a way that the maximum distance is maintained
between the sets of support vectors. This orientation determines the accuracy of
classication with SVM classier for unseen instances. For establishing the decision
surface, a few training samples that are present at the edge of the class distribution
of the support vectors are needed. On the other hand, if conventional maximum-
likelihood classication is used, large number of training samples are required to
gain accurate classication. Hence, using SVM for classication saves the training
data acquisition [10].
Support vector machine classier gives a better result for two-class classica-
tion problem [11]. It maps input vectors to a high dimensional feature space. A
hyperplane separates both linear and non-linear data in two classes. The hyper-
plane is found with the help of support vector (training tuples) and margin (dened
10
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by support vectors) [12]. SVMs are the successful and resilient classication al-
gorithms [11] [13]. The SVM supports only binary classication and deals with
maximizing the margin that is the minimum distance from nearest example to the
separating hyperplane. The concept of SVM can be extended to multiclass classi-
cation [14] [15].
1.9 Multiclass Support Vector Machine
As SVM solves only binary class classication problem, the multiclass problem needs
to be decomposed into several binary class problems. Each of the binary classiers is
applied to new data point and the frequency of number of times the point is assigned
the same label is counted and the label with highest count is assigned to that point.
There are several methods for the decomposition of multiclass problem [16].
1.9.1 One-verses-all
One-verses-all is also called as the winner takes all strategy. This is the simplest
approach to reducing the problem of classication from k classes into k binary prob-
lems. Each problem is dierent from other k-1 problems. This method requires k
binary classes in which we train kth classier with positive example belonging to
class k and negative examples belonging to other k-1 classes. An unknown example
is tested, and the classier for which maximum output is produced is considered
to be the winner class. That class label is assigned to that example. Although
this approach is simple, its performance can be compared with more complicated
approaches [17].
1.9.2 One-versus-one
For every pair of dierent classes, one binary classier is constructed. In this way,
the multiclass problem is broken into a series of a set of binary class problems so
11
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that we can apply SVM model for each pair of classes. Total k(k-1)/2 classiers
are needed to classify the unknown data. The binary classier is trained taking one
class as positive and other class as negative. For a new data point x if that classier
classies x in rst class, then a vote is added to thisclass. If the classier classies x
in the second class, the vote is added to the second class. This process is repeated
for each of the k(k-1)/2 classiers. Finally, the label of the class with maximum
number of votes is assigned to the new data point x. In this way the class to which
the unknown data point belongs is predicted [17] [18].
1.10 Motivation
The standard intrusion detection dataset contains 22 types of attack. The research
work on machine learning and intrusion detection system have classied the attacks
on two classes or ve classes [2]. As the number of attacks is growing day by day,
there is a need to classify the attack in exactly one of the 22 classes with maximum
accuracy. Tarun et al. [1] have classied the unknown data in one of the 22 classes
of attacks with an accuracy of 91.673%. The accuracy can further be improved by
using dierent datasets and new multiclass SVM technique. The greater accuracy
and speed will improve the performance of IDS. This paper provides the better
solution for such type of classication.
1.11 Objective
• Removing irrelevant and redundant attributes using gini index
Gini(D) = 1 
mX
i=1
p2i (1.1)
pi is the probability that the tuple belongs to class Ci where i is the number
of classes. D is the dataset.
• Logging and analysing new attacks using honeypot.
12
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• Implementing multiclass SVM classier for categorising attack in its specic
type.
1.12 Thesis Layout
The organization of thesis is as follows |
Chapter 2:Literature Review In this chapter, the detailed study on literature on
feature selection, feature reduction, honeypot and multiclass SVM.
Chapter 3:Classication of attacks using MSVM This chapter contains honeypot
implementation, Methods in multiclass SVM and comparison of the whole system
with existing system.
Chapter 4:Result and discussion This chapter includes the result of feature se-
lection using Gini index, feature reduction using PCA and SVM, Detection of a
particular attack using multiclass SVM.
Chapter 5:Conclusion
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, the detailed study of literature on feature selection, feature reduc-
tion, honeypot and multiclass SVM. The dataset may contain many irrelevant and
redundant attributes(features) which do not contribute to the output. But their
presence aects the performance of the system. It is necessary to identify and re-
move such attributes. This process is called as feature selection. It not only increases
the speed and accuracy of the system but makes the system work eectively. The
dimensionality of the feature space is referred to as the feature reduction. Measure-
ment of a certain aspect of an object is called as dimension. The study for methods
of reducing number of dimensions describing the object is called as dimensionality
reduction or feature reduction. Honeypot is the system to deceive the attacker by
providing the decoy system that seems to be highly valuable, but badly secured so
that the attacker can interact with that system. Multiclass Support Vector Machine
is the extended form of SVM classier that can be applied to the intrusion detection
dataset to classify the attack in its particular type.
2.1 Feature Selection
Relief et al.. [19] preprocesses irrelevant features and eliminates them by using sta-
tistical methods. Based on the Euclidian distance measure, near miss and near hit
14
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instances are found for each instance in a sample of instances that are picked ran-
domly. An instance is chosen, and the instance that is having minimum Euclidean
distance as compared to the other instances to that of the selected instance is near
hit. The instance with the minimum Euclidean distance among all instances of the
dierent class is called as the near miss. In the beginning, the weights of the features
are initialized to zero, and they are updated based on the intuitive idea that a fea-
ture is more relevant if it distinguishes an instance and its near miss. The weights of
all the features are compared with the threshold value. All thefeatureswith greater
weights than the threshold are chosen.
Cardie et al. [20] implements an algorithm based on decision tree for feature
selection as per the need. Proven [21] uses the same approach with greedy method for
constructing Bayesian Network. According to Hall, the useful features are correlated
with the class and not related to one another. Based on this proposition, the set
of features is evaluated for their usefulness. For discovering feature subset boosted
decision stumps are used [22]. According to Hall [23], the good features are correlated
with the class and not related to one another. Based on this proposition, the set
of features is evaluated for their usefulness. Yu and Liu [24] presented a novel
approach for correlation of features and introduced a fast lter method that can
remove irrelevant and redundant features.
2.2 Feature Reduction
The reduction of dimensionality of the feature space is referred to as the feature
reduction. Measurement of a certain aspect of an object is called as dimension.
The study for methods of reducing number of dimensions describing the object is
called for dimensionality reduction. Removing irrelevant and redundant data reduces
the computational cost and avoid data over-tting [25]. It improves the quality of
data for ecient data-intensive processing task such as data mining and pattern
recognition. The experiments have shown that as the dimensionality increases, the
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performance of the system decreases [26].
2.3 Honeypot
Honeypot is the system to deceive the attacker by providing the decoy system that
seems to be highly valuable, but badly secured so that the attacker can interact
with that system. The administrator can analyze the attacker's interaction with
the system and categorize that attack by which the intent of the attackers can be
known, as discussed in [7] [8]. The related work in honeypot is given in Table 2.1.
2.4 Multiclass SVM
Chen et al. [34] uses hierarchical SVM for clustering the classes into the binary tree.
The clusters are formed by arranging the classes into the undirected graph. The
weights of the edge are the Kullback-Leibler distances between every class and other
class. Each node of the tree is the binary classier SVM. Hansung Lee et.al. [35]
proposes a new intrusion detection system model. This model supports advantages
of both signature-based and anomaly based IDS and overcomes their disadvantages.
This new IDS called multistep multiclass IDS satises the following necessities: 1)
Speeds up detection, 2) Gives detailed information of attacks, 3) Ecient with
respect to cost and learning, 4) Increases scalability of the system. It distinguishes
normal and attack data and classies it into one of the ve attacks DOS, R2L, U2R
and Probing attacks. Hsu et.al. [36] has proposed two methods one by considering
all data at once and second is a decomposition implementation.
Srinivas Mukkamala [3] et.al. constructs SVM intrusion detection system that
consists of three phases:
1. Preprocessing: an automated parser is used for processing TCP/P data which
isselected randomlyand converting into machine readable format.
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Table 2.1: Related Work in Honeypot
Year Author Type Attack
Type
Work Done
2011 Saurabh
et.
al [9]
l NA Due to the lack of capabilities of existing security
devices, there is a need to study honeypot deploy-
ment and analyze tools, methods and targets of
the attacker.
2006 Nguyen
et
al. [8]
h NA The purpose of this paper is to deploy a honeypot
in such a way that it is well concealed from the
intruder. The honeypot is deployed on Xen virtual
machine with system Xebek.
2004 Kuwatly
et
al. [27]
h+l NA The dynamic honeypot approach integrates pas-
sive or active probing and virtual honeypot.
2006 Alata
et
al. [28]
h+l U2R The results based on a six months period using
high interaction honeypot concludes that if the
password is found to be weak it is replaced by
strong one
2009 Vinu
et
al. [29]
NA DOS This paper has proposed the eective honeypot
model for secured communication of authorized
client and server
2009 Shujun
et
al. [30]
NA Phishing Honeypot is used to collect important information
regarding attackers activity
2009 Jianwei
et
al. [31]
h malware This paper has introduced a high interaction
toolkit called HoneyBow containing three tools
MwFetcher, MwWatcher, MwHunter
2003 Lance
et
al. [32]
NA The
ad-
vance
insider
This paper detects the threats done by the autho-
rised insider
2009 Almotairi
et
al. [33]
l NA The technique for detecting new attacks using
PCA with low interaction honeypot is presented
in this paper
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2. Training: The SVM is then trained to identify normal and attack data. 41
features are classied into two classes normal and attack. The experiment is
carried out with the default regularisation parameter c=1000 and optimisation
is done for 2733 iterations. The total number of misclassied data points are 6
out of 7312 training set. CPU runtime is 17.77 sec and a dierence of 0.00072
is achieved. 204 support vectors with 29 at upper bound are used. The linear
loss during the process was 17.78295.
3. Testing: The performance is measured for testing data. The testing set con-
tains 6980 points with 41 features. The accuracy received is 99.50% with total
runtime 1.63 sec.
According to latest research, there are a lot of attempts to improve IDS using the
data mining and machine learning techniques [37]. The detection accuracy can be
maximised by using machine learning algorithms. Chandrasekhar et al. proposed a
four module approach for classication.
1. K-means clustering module: The training dataset is clustered into k clusters.
2. Neuro-fuzzy training module: This module trains k neural networks, Each of
the data is trained with the neural network that is associated with the cluster
to which that data belongs.
3. SVM training vector module: SVM classication vector is generated in this
module.
4. Radial SVM classication module: Intrusion is detected by applying radial
SVM, and the classication is done accordingly.
The neuro-fuzzy architecture is used to show how the classiers are trained. It
has used ve classiers for ve clusters. The SVM classier reduces the number
of attributes from 34 to 6. The experimental setup uses sensitivity, specicity and
18
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accuracy as the performance evaluation metrics.
Sensitivity is the proportion of actual positives which are correctly classied.
Sensitivity =
TP
TP + FN
(2.1)
Specicity is the proportion of true negatives which are correctly classied.
Specificity =
TN
TN + FP
(2.2)
The accuracy is the closeness of measurement of true values.
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(2.3)
The accuracy is calculated for each of the four classes i.e., DOS, U2R, R2L, Probe
attack. Tarun et al. [1] have focused on applying multiclass SVM classier with the
one-versus-one approach. Both misuse detection and anomaly detection systems are
used to identify the attack. The KDD cup99 dataset was used as a training and
testing dataset. The implementation has been done in two steps: Data preparation
for training and Training and testing.
1. Data preparation for training
(a) Tarun et al. has used LIBSVM, which accepts only alphanumeric values.
So dierent types of alphanumeric strings need to be determined for each
type of attacks in the training as well as testing dataset.
(b) The numeric values are assigned to the strings and labels of dierent
types of attack. In this way, KDD dataset is converted into the format
accepted by LIBSVM.
(c) Precise distribution of attack is determined.
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(d) The confusion matrix is constructed and the cost per training sample is
determined in the testing stage.
2. Training and testing:
(a) The Radial Basic Function (RBF) kernel option is used, and the value of
C is changed and the value of gamma is set to the default of 1/41. The
training is done in 23 classes including 22 attacks and one normal class.
(b) The datasets that are used for training and testing have a lot of dierence
in the probability distribution. So cross-validation is not used.
The classication accuracy for a multiclass having 23 classes has the accuracy of
91.6738%.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed how the feature selection is used in dierent
dataset by various authors. Feature reduction is crucial for reducing the dimen-
sionality of the dataset. Related work in honeypot and Multiclass support vector
machine is mentioned in this chapter. The next chapter gives the details of the
implementation of all these techniques.
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Classication of attacks using
MSVM
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the attacks are classied into two or ve categories
according to the previous research. But there is a need to know the exact type of
an attack. To fulll this purpose, Multiclass SVM, which is a new technique in the
eld of intrusion detection, is used. As SVM solves only binary class classication
problem, the multiclass problem needs to be decomposed into several binary class
problems. Each of the binary classiers is applied to new data point and the fre-
quency of number of times the point is assigned the same label is counted and the
label with highest count is assigned to that point. For data preprocessing, we are
using Gini index as a feature selection technique and Principle Component Analysis
as a feature reduction technique. Honeypot system is also included for collecting
more information regarding new attacks. This system will improve the intrusion
detection system.
3.1 Feature selection using Gini index
Anomaly detection refers to nding out the abnormal pattern of trac or abnormal
behavior from network or system. The dataset used for intrusion detection needs to
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be preprocessed for better results. For feature ranking, Gini index is used to nd the
ranking of each of the 41 features of KDDcup99 dataset for getting most relevant
features [12].
Gini(D) = 1 
mX
i=1
p2i (3.1)
pi is the probability that the tuple belongs to partition i where i is the number of
partitions. D is the dataset.
The binary partitioning is used for partitioning the dataset. The dataset is divided
into 2 parts D1 and D2. The gini index for attribute A in the dataset is calculated
by using following equation:
GiniA(D) =
jD1j
jDj Gini(D1) +
jD2j
jDj Gini(D2) (3.2)
The reduction in impurity (or the loss of information)after partition on attribute A
is given by:
Gini(A) = Gini(D) GiniA(D) (3.3)
The attribute which gives maximum reduction in the impurity is selected as the
most relevent attribute.
3.2 Feature Reduction
The principal component analysis is used for reducing the dimensionality of the
dataset. The basic steps are as follows:
• First the input data is normalised to make each attribute fall in the given
range. The normalised data controls the dominance of large domain attributes
over the small domain attribute.
• The k orthonormal vectors are computed to provide the basis of normalised
input data. Each vector points in a direction perpendicular to the other. They
are called as principal components.
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• The principal components are sorted in order of decreasing signicance or
strength. They serve as a new set of axes that provide essential information
about axes in a way such that rst axes gives maximum variance, the second
gives the next highest variance and so on. In this way the rst few principal
components that contribute more variance are considered and the remaining
are discarded.
3.3 Honeypot Conguration
The honeypot is congured on the virtual system like Vmware. In low interaction
honeypot, there are individual ngerprint les that contain the information about
how the particular operating system will respond. For example, if we want to
show the attacker that we are running Windows XP operating system, it will
react with certain characteristics, which will be used by the honeypot to respond
to the attacker. The attacker will think that he is working with the Windows
XP operating system, but he will never know that he is dealing with the virtual
operating system. The few of the essential features of honeyd are creation, setting,
binding and adding. In the conguration process, we are going to create a template
with some name or default:
create< template  name >
create default
dynamic< template  name >
Then we set the personality of the honeypot, i.e, the operating system and mention
certain protocol or action such as reset, block or open.
set < templatename > personality < personality   name >
set < templatename > default < proto > action < action >
We are adding the particular template along with protocol name, port number and
action.
add < template  name >< proto > port < port  number >< action >
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Fig.3.1 shows the working model of IDS and honeypot together. The intru-
sion detection System redirects the attacker to the honeypot when the malicious
activity is detected. The intruder interacts with the honeypot and tries to know its
vulnerabilities and open ports. The honeypot allows to gain access to the limited
resources of the system so that it should not make any harm to the necessary les
and resources. The honeypot logs the attack activities of the particular intruder.
This log le is then used to create new rules that are further added to the list of
already generated rules. Once this is done, when the same type of behavior occurs
next time, this is directly considered as attack and there is no need to redirect that
intruder to the honeypot. In this way, the novel attacks can be detected by the
intrusion detection system.
Figure 3.1: The working model of IDS and honeypot
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3.4 Classication using multiclass SVM
We are using one against one method of multiclass support vector machine. The
cross validation method is also used. We are using three intrusion detection datasets;
KDD corrected dataset, NSLKDD dataset and Gure KDD dataset for training and
testing purpose. The details are as mentioned in the table 3.1 below:
Table 3.1: The details of datasets
Dataset Number of
instances for
training
Number of
instances for
testing
Number of
instances
correctly
classied
Accuracy
KDD cor-
rected
77291 311029 284421 91.445%
NSL KDD 47736 125973 118447 94.025%
Gure KDD 160904 178810 177283 99.146%
The confusion matrices for KDD corrected dataset, Gure KDD dataset and NSL
KDD dataset are given in Table 5.1, Table 5.3 and Table 5.2 respectively. We have
removed some rows and columns from the confusion matrix because they were having
all zero values.
3.5 Comparison
It is necessary to detect the attack by its particular type with greater accuracy.
The data mining techniques are very useful for such classication. We have
used multiclass support vector machine approach for the classication of various
unknown attacks. The comparison of existing classication and new classication
is tabulated as follows:
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Table 3.2: The comparison of multiclass classication
New system Existing System
Datasets KDD corrected, Gure KDD,
NSL KDD
KDD cup99
conguration Intel i7, 3.4 GHz,8 GB
RAM, Windows 8.1, 64-bit
OS
Pentium III - 933 MHz pro-
cessor with 256 MB of RAM
Accuracy of detection 91.445% using KDD cor-
rected dataset, 94.025%
using NSL KDD dataset,
99.146% using Gure KDD
dataset
91.673% using KDD cup99
dataset
The existing research [1] failed to do that, and the accuracy of detection of
attack was 91.673%. The old dataset KDD cup99 was used for evaluation. We
have used three datasets KDD corrected dataset, NSLKDD dataset and Gure KDD
dataset for training and testing. By using Gure KDD dataset, we have got the
maximum accuracy, i.e., 99.146%. By using NSL KDD dataset, we got the accuracy
of 94.025% and the accuracy of 91.445% using KDD corrected dataset.In earlier
work, the machine conguration was as follows: Pentium III - 933 MHz processor
with 256 MB of RAM. We have also calculated the confusion matrices for all the
three datasets. Our system conguration is Intel i7, 3.4 GHz,8 GB RAM, Windows
8.1, 64-bit OS, and we have used Matlab 2015a. We have also calculated the
confusion matrices for all the three datasets. After calculating confusion matrices,
we have found that some of the rows and columns contain all zero values. So we
have removed such rows and columns.
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3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have described our proposed work on feature selection to select
most relevant features by using Gini index. Feature reduction using PCA with SVM
classier is very useful for dimensionality reduction. Honeypot captures the new
attacks for analysis. The multiclass SVM classier classies the attacks in one of
the particular types of attacks. In the next chapter, the results of all the proposed
work are presented.
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Result and discussion
4.1 Feature selection using Gini Index
The Gini index method is used for nding ranks of each feature in the KDDcorrected
dataset, nslKDD dataset and Gure dataset. Rank 1 indicates least relevant feature.
Figure 4.1: Gini Result-1
Figure 4.2: Gini Result-2
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Figure 4.3: Gini Result-3
4.2 Feature Reduction
The feature reduction using PCA along with SVM classier gives the following result:
Figure 4.4: Feature reduction
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4.3 Logs in Honeypot
For analysing new attacks, it is necessary to get more information about the attack.
For this purpose, we have used the honeypot system to communicate with the at-
tacker. The honeypot is congured in such a way that it logs the activities of attack
that can be used later. The logs generated by honeypot are as shown below:
Figure 4.5: Honeypot conguration
4.4 Result of implementing Multiclass SVM
The three datasets are used for training and testing of multiclass support vector ma-
chine classier: KDD corrected dataset, NSL KDD dataset and Gure KDD dataset.
The results are mensioned in the subsequent sections.
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4.4.1 Attackwise Accuracy of Datasets
The multiclass SVM classier classies the attack with its particular type. There
are total 23 attacks in NSLKDD dataset, 38 attacks in KDD corrected dataset and
28 attacks in Gure KDD dataset. The detection accuracy of the classier according
to each attack in the respective datasets is tabulated as follows:
Table 4.1 presents attackwise accuracy of NSL KDD dataset.
Table 4.2 presents attackwise accuracy of KDD corrected dataset.
Table 4.3 presents attackwise accuracy of Gure KDD dataset.
4.4.2 Confusion matrices
The confusion matrices are calculated for three datasets KDD corrected dataset,
Gure KDD dataset, NSL KDD dataset are as shown below:
Table 5.1 presents confusion matrix of KDD corrected dataset.
Table 5.3 presents confusion matrix of Gure KDD dataset.
Table 5.2 presents confusion matrix of NSL KDD dataset.
4.4.3 ROC curve for multiclass classication
A graphical approach for displaying balance between TPR(true positive rate) and
FPR(false positive rate) of a classier is called as a reciever operating characteristic
curve. The critical points along ROC curve are interpreted as follows:
(TPR=0,FPR=0): Model predicts every instance to be negative class
(TPR=1,FPR=1): Model predicts every instance to be positive class
(TPR=0,FPR=0): Model predicts correctly. So it is the ideal model
The model is good if it is located close to the upper left corner, because the
diagonal represents random guesses as it connects points (TPR=0,FPR=0) and
(TPR=1,FPR=1). The ROC curve for datasets KDD corrected, NSL KDD and
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Gure KDD are as follows:
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Figure 4.6: ROC curve for KDD corrected dataset
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Figure 4.7: ROC curve for NSL KDD dataset
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Figure 4.8: ROC curve for Gure KDD dataset
4.5 Summary
This chapter gives the detailed information of all the results regarding Feature se-
lection using Gini index, how the features dimensionality is reduced using PCA with
SVM. The attack information is logged using honeypot. The attacks can be classied
into its particular type using multiclass SVM classier. The results are presented in
the tables of attack wise accuracy of datasets and confusion matrices.
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Table 4.1: NSL KDD dataset
Sr no. Attack Name Number of in-
stances
Accuracy
1 Normal 67343 97.68%
2 Neptune 41214 99.97%
3 Warezclient 890 55.28%
4 Ipsweep 3599 95.83%
5 Portsweep 2931 97.30%
6 Teardrop 892 99.10%
7 Nmap 1493 80.98%
8 Back 956 20.92%
9 Smurf 2646 97.51%
10 Satan 3633 91.52%
11 Warezmaster 20 95.00%
12 Buer overow 30 0.00%
13 Ftp write 8 0.00%
14 Guess passwd 53 96.23%
15 Imap 11 0.00%
16 Land 18 94.44%
17 Loadmodule 9 0.00%
18 Multihop 7 0.00%
19 Phf 4 0.00%
20 Pod 201 51.74%
21 Rootkit 10 0.00%
22 Spy 2 0.00%
28 Perl 3 0.00%
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Table 4.2: KDD corrected dataset
Sr no. Attack Name Number of in-
stances
Accuracy
1 Normal 9711 95.55%
2 Neptune 4657 99.83%
4 Ipsweep 141 97.16%
5 Portsweep 157 96.82%
6 Teardrop 12 66.67%
7 Nmap 73 100.00%
8 Back 359 18.11%
9 Smurf 665 100.00%
10 Satan 735 98.91%
11 Warezmaster 944 90.47%
12 Buer overow 20 35.00%
13 Ftp write 3 0.00%
14 Guess passwd 1231 79.29%
15 Imap 1 0.00%
16 Land 7 100.00%
17 Loadmodule 2 0.00%
18 Multihop 18 0.00%
19 Phf 2 0.00%
20 Pod 41 80.49%
21 Rootkit 13 0.00%
23 Apache2 737 99.46%
24 Httptunnel 133 93.98%
25 Mailbomb 293 75.43%
26 Mscan 996 92.67%
27 Named 17 0.00%
28 Perl 2 0.00%
29 Processtable 685 99.71%
30 Ps 15 0.00%
31 Saint 319 0.00%
32 Sendmail 14 0.00%
33 Snmapgetattack 178 0.00%
34 Snmapguess 331 96.68%
35 Sqlattack 2 0.00%
36 Udpstorm 2 0.00%
37 Worm 2 0.00%
38 Xlock 9 0.00%
39 Xsnoop 4 0.00%
40 Xterm 13 0.00%
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Table 4.3: Gure KDD dataset
Sr no. Attack Name Number of instances Accuracy
1 Anomaly 9 0.00%
2 Dict 879 98.29%
3 Dict simple 1 0.00%
4 Eject 11 0.00%
5 Eject fail 1 0.00%
6 Ffb 10 0.00%
7 Ffb clear 1 0.00%
8 Format 6 0.00%
9 Format clear 1 0.00%
10 Format fail 10 0.00%
11 Ftp write 8 0.00%
12 Guest 50 98.00%
13 Imap 7 0.00%
14 Land 35 100.00%
15 Load clear 1 0.00%
16 Multihop 9 0.00%
17 Normal 174873 99.99%
18 Perl clear 1 0.00%
19 Perlmagic 4 0.00%
20 Phf 5 0.00%
21 Rootkit 29 0.00%
22 Spy 2 0.00%
23 Syslog 4 0.00%
24 Teardrop 1085 99.17%
25 Warez 1 0.00%
26 Warezclient 1749 21.73%
27 Warezmaster 19 78.95%
28 Loadmodule 8 0.00%
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Conclusion
As the attacks and information threats are increasing rapidly there is a need for
an improved intrusion detection system that can cope with the situation. We have
designed an intrusion detection system working along with honeypots and multiclass
support vector machine classier. The primary objective of the honeypot is to
collect intense attack patterns and decode it into human understandable format. We
have implemented a virtual honeypot using honeyd which is installed on Ubuntu
14 machine and the attack patterns are captured whenever recommended by the
IDS. The well-known probe attacking tools are used for attacking the system by us.
The packets captured by the honeypot is decoded and converted into csv format
for subsequent analysis. A multiclass support vector machine classier is used for
classication of attacks on intrusion datasets. Three benchmark datasets namely
KDD corrected, NSL KDD and GureKDD are used for training and testing the
model. The MSVM model is implemented using LIBSVM class under Matlab 2015a.
Cross validation method is applied to the datasets to select proper subset of training
and testing instances. The model can determine a particular known type of attack
when the unknown instances need to be classied. This method provides better
detection accuracy and reduces the complexity of the model.
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Scope for Further Research
The model can be improved training and testing with the new upcoming intrusion
detection datasets with more number of attacks and it can also be optimized by
using good optimization algorithms.
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Table 5.3: Gure KDD confusion matrix
0 2 12 14 17 24 26 27
1 0 0 0 9 0 0 0
2 864 0 0 15 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 1 0 10 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 10 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 6 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 8 0 0 0
12 0 49 0 1 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 7 0 0 0
14 0 0 35 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 9 0 0 0
17 3 0 2 174864 0 3 1
18 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 5 0 0 0
21 1 0 0 28 0 0 0
22 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
23 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 9 1076 0 0
25 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
26 0 0 0 1369 0 380 0
27 0 0 0 4 0 0 15
28 0 0 0 8 0 0 0
48
